Emerging Stage for Great Power Competition: Russia’s Influence in Sudan amid Political Turmoil

This article first appeared in the SiC Report “The Global South in an Era of Great Power Competition. Click here to access the introduction and a full pdf download of the Report.

By Salma Abdalla (PhD), Senior Researcher, Raad Peace Research Institute

Abstract: Sudan’s strategic geographical location gave it great importance to Russia’s security interests in the region, besides Russia’s greed in Sudan’s rich natural resources including minerals and the huge potential of the agricultural lands. Russia’s interests in Sudan motivate its alignment with the military leaders and the strongmen hungry for power, which is opposed by the pro-democracy movement in the country. To safeguard its interests in the African continent, Russia seeks to enhance its presence in Sudan, establish a Russian military base in the Red Sea, and extract as much as possible of Sudan’s gold. This paper seeks to understand what are the roles played by the paramilitary Russian Wagner group in Sudan? How do the activities of the Wagner group undermine a democratic transition and the rule of law, and produce insecurity in Sudan?  

1. Introduction

In April 2023, a war erupted in Sudan between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) under the command of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Daglo known as Hemedti. The war has devastated the country, especially the capital city Khartoum and the war-torn Darfur region, with a heavy death toll, an uncounted number of injured, and at least six million civilians displaced. The infrastructure destructions are enormous and the population lost their means of living overnight. The war is a power struggle between the commanders of SAF and RSF who for years have been strong allies until they turned on each other. During the past years, following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 as a result of the popular uprising, al-Burhan and Daglo jointly headed the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Transitional Sovereignty Council that governed Sudan consecutively and together orchestrated a military coup in October 2021 that ended the civilian-military power sharing arrangement established in August 2019. 

While domestic dynamics of power struggle between local actors sparked the war, regional and global powers interventions siding with one of the warring parties contributed to the prolongation of the war.¹ Sudan emerged as a stage for great power competition when superpowers embarked on expanding their presence and influence in Africa. In recent years, Russia increased its influence in Sudan to protect their economic and security interests. In the ongoing war in Sudan, the Russian paramilitary Wagner group has been backing one of the warring parties – the RSF – against the Sudan army. Against the backdrop of the intensive Russian involvement in Sudan in recent years, this article seeks to understand the roles played by the paramilitary Russian Wagner group in Sudan, and asks: How are the activities of the Wagner group undermining peace, democratic transition, the rule of law and good governance in Sudan? 

This article is based on a thorough and critical review of existing knowledge about the influence of superpower competition on the political developments in Sudan in recent years. The article is based on an analysis of various sources including academic publications, reports, policy briefs, and media coverage on this topic. To frame the context of Russia's influence in Sudan, the article starts by outlining the Russian Foreign Policy in Africa, especially its quest to build economic and political relations with the continent to achieve its strategic goals. The second section analyzes the development of the Russian engagement in Sudan, followed by a section exploring the development and implications of the relations between Russia, the paramilitary Wagner group, and the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The article concludes with a discussion of the ways in which Great Power competition can exacerbate insecurity in the Global South.

2. Africa in Russian Foreign Policy 

Africa’s strategic importance to Russia is well-established. Russia’s exploration of opportunities in Africa goes back to the eighteenth century when Russian leaders began to extend their influences in the continent. An important turning point in the Russia-Africa relationship was Russia’s military role in Africa during World War I. During the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) supported the liberation movements in Africa, materially and militarily, to confront Western domination in Africa. However, with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia’s influence in Africa declined. During the noughties, Russia resumed efforts to build economic and political relations with Africa to achieve strategic goals such as ending its isolation due to Western sanctions, finding allies in Africa, increasing economic investments, and eliminating Western influence in the continent. In this vein, Russia established relations with countries such as Zimbabwe, Central Africa Republic, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Sudan. 

Russia’s foreign policy has been hostile to the Western and American hegemony and seeks to undermine the global power structure. For Russia, Africa is at the heart of this strategy as it is the space where the West exercises its domination most, besides Russia’s narrative of prioritizing economic interests in the continent. Seemingly, Russia’s foreign policy priorities have been in harmony with that of the elites in Africa who hold anti-Western sentiments. Consequently, the last decade witnessed intensive Russian diplomatic initiatives in Africa to build partnerships that align with Russian geostrategic, political, and economic goals in the continent.   

In the Sahel for instance, Russia strengthened its influence and presented itself as a replacement of the European and Western countries through establishing security partnerships in the region. In the process, Russia has taken advantage of political instability to exploit resources, and support authoritarian regimes in consolidating their power. Russia utilizes several tools to achieve its strategic objectives in the continent, which include propaganda campaigns that promote the narrative that Russia is supporting Africa’s liberation from Western imperialism. The role of private military companies such as the Wagner group has been instrumental for the Russian government to achieve its strategic goals in Africa. Since 2014, Russia has relied heavily on private military contractors such as the Wagner group to achieve its strategic objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa.² Although the Wagner group’s presence there was identified as to protect the Russian companies in Africa, in reality, the Wagner group’s role extended to establish economic relations in extractive activities such as natural resource mining. Politically, the Wagner group helped Russia establish links and political alliances in the continent. In addition, the Wagner group has established military relations in Africa by providing weapon support, military training, and security services to sympathetic regimes. The next section will focus on the case of Sudan and how it fits in the wider context of the Russia-African relationship.  

3. Russian Influence in Sudan

Sudan’s geographical location is of strategic importance to Russia’s security interests in the region,³ while the country’s rich natural resources and agricultural potential offer extractive opportunities for Russian industry. To safeguard its interests in the African continent, Russia seeks to enhance its presence in Sudan, establish a Russian military base in the Red Sea, and extract as much as possible of Sudan’s gold. Russian engagement in Sudan has grown since the 1960s, with a hiatus in the 1970s during former President Jaafar Nimeiry’s rule (1971–1985), when Moscow backed a failed military coup attempt against Nimeiry’s regime. The relationship between the two countries resumed in the 1990s and tightened during the al-Bashir regime (1989–2019), with abundant exchanges of diplomatic visits and the signing of bilateral agreements in various fields, including key military collaboration agreements signed between Khartoum and Moscow in 2020.⁴ Since 2012, the two countries have engaged in talks about Russia’s support for the rehabilitation of the SAF.⁵ In addition, Russia has continuously supported the Government of Sudan in international forums. In 2008 and 2016, Russia rejected and withdrew a ratification to indict al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Darfur since 2005.  

The Khartoum–Moscow relationship reached its peak in 2017, when former President al-Bashir visited Russia, requesting Putin’s protection from U.S. hostility and, in return, offering to make Sudan Russia’s gateway to Africa.⁶ Al-Bashir’s visit to Moscow was brokered and guarded by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgen Prigozhin, who had already been active in other African countries and convinced President Putin to finally meet al-Bashir after he rejected Khartoum’s earlier requests for a meeting. In return, al-Bashir rewarded the Wagner Group with an exceptional concession: mining rights in Sudan and permission to have their planes land and take off in the country without monitoring and inspection by Sudanese authorities—a privilege that proved instrumental when the group’s activities extended to gold mining.⁷ In the weeks following al-Bashir’s visit to Moscow, Wagner group forces arrived in Sudan to develop the mining sector. In parallel, Russia has been a strong supporter of Sudan in the international forums such as the UN Security Council. As mentioned earlier, in 2017 Russian officials took the side of the Sudanese government and pushed for a gradual reduction of the joint United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur — a peacekeeping force operating in Darfur – to be replaced by Sudanese forces.⁸

In 2018, it was estimated that the number of Wagner forces in Sudan increased from about 100 to 500 soldiers, stationed to secure Russia’s gold mining companies and sites, especially in the borders between Sudan and Central Africa Republic. However, their role quickly extended to offer military training to the RSF. In 2018, the Wagner group assisted the Sudanese security forces, including the RSF, in violently suppressing the pro-democracy protests and advised al-Bashir to utilize media campaigns to discredit the protests that eventually resulted in the ouster of al-Bashir from power in April 2019.⁹

Following the ouster of al-Bashir in 2019, Russia backed the military generals against the civilians who were hostile towards Russia’s influence in Sudan¹⁰ and aligned with the military component of the transitional government including SAF and RSF. The generals on their side needed Russia’s political, economic, and security support, which strengthened their control.¹¹ As a result, Russia joined China in blocking a draft of a UN Security Council resolution condemning the killing of civilians by the Sudanese military and calling on the international community for an immediate end to the violence against civilians in Sudan. The Russian deputy representative to the UN described the draft resolution as an “unbalanced statement” that could worsen the situation, while the Russian Foreign Ministry opposed external interference in Sudan.¹² Russia’s economic interests in Sudan and its geopolitical ambitions in Africa motivated its alignment with the military governments in Sudan.¹³

Russia has long been interested in expanding its military influence in the region; the idea of building a military port in the Red Sea emerged as early as 2012.¹⁴ In December 2020, a military cooperation agreement was signed between Moscow and Khartoum to establish Russia’s first military base in Africa in Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. For a duration of 25 years — and renewable for an additional 10 years — the agreement granted Russia the right to use Sudanese airports to transport weapons, ammunition, and equipment needed to support the base, in addition to allowing the docking of four ships and a maximum of 300 personnel at the port. This naval center is Russia’s first in Africa and its second outside the former Soviet Union.¹⁵ However, in 2021, the military government declared a freeze on the agreement due to U.S. pressure; thus, it appears that the military leaders in Sudan utilized the agreement with Russia as a tactic to gain Western support.¹⁶

4. The Partnership between Russia and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 

The political history of Sudan is marked by long civil wars, political instability, and autocracies interspersed by short-lived civilian governments. One of the root causes of civil wars is the rebellion against the centralization of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite at the center while most regions remained neglected and inadequately represented. To curb the rebellion in the regions, successive governments utilized the strategy of arming militias to fight on their behalf. The RSF that is fighting the SAF today in Sudan is an offspring of the Janjaweed militia that the former regime armed to fight the rebellion in Darfur since 2003, where it is accused of committing genocide and war crimes against civilians. In 2013, the government formalized the Janjaweed militia, renaming itself the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and funded it generously from the national budget. The former President Omar al-Bashir considered the leader of the RSF as his ‘protector’ and enabled the RSF to counterbalance the army against any coups. Over the years, the RSF expanded to reach 120,000 soldiers, almost equivalent to SAF, and its leader engaged in major economic activities including gold mining. In 2015, the RSF sent mercenary soldiers to fight the Houthis in the war in Yemen on behalf of the Saudi-UAE lead Arab Alliance, which has been lucrative for the RSF. RSF also engaged in counter terrorism and high-profile missions such as the EU-commissioned border control project to stop illegal migration crossing through Sudan to Europe. Gold mining and the war in Yemen gained the RSF not only economic power but also relations with regional and global actors. 

Following the ouster of al-Bashir regime in 2019 as a result of a popular uprisings, the leader of RSF – Hemedti – emerged in the Sudanese political scene as the second man in the transitional government and gained unprecedented legitimacy. Consequently, Russia has found in the RSF a partner to achieve its goals in Sudan,¹⁷ as Hemedti established close relations with Russia and became Wagner’s main military ally in Sudan.¹⁸ The relationship between Hemedti and the Wagner group further strengthened after the 25 October, 2021 military coup that was orchestrated by the military branch (SAF & RSF) of the transitional government and ended the power-sharing deal between the civilians the military that was supposed to lead the country towards general elections and democratic transition. Hemedti’s visit to Moscow in 2022 on the same day when Russia launched its war in Ukraine and his reception by high-ranking officials in the Russian regime was an official inauguration of the partnership between Russia and the RSF. 

Through the facilitation of the RSF that for years had been in control of the gold mining industry in Sudan, the Wagner Group expanded its economic activities in Sudan and secured lucrative gold mining concessions in Darfur and in Blue Nile state. For Russia, the alignment with Hemedti availed channels to smuggle gold from Sudan to Russia through Dubai that have helped the Russian multiply its gold reserve and to survive the Western sanctions imposed after Russia declared war on Ukraine.¹⁹ Taking advantage of deals made with former President al-Bashir, Russian companies active in gold mining in Sudan carry out illegal activities, and any reform efforts aimed at controlling corrupt practices and limiting the smuggling of gold are obstructed by security forces.²⁰ Days before his death in a plane crash in August 2023, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin met with RSF officers in Bangui, Central African Republic, who gave him gold bars in appreciation for providing the RSF with weapons in the ongoing war against the SAF.²¹

In return, Russia provided military support to the RSF including weapons supply and military training activities through the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group’s supplying of the RSF with surface-to-air missiles during the ongoing armed conflict with the SAF that started on 15 April 2023 marked the culmination of years of collaboration (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2023). While it is true that the war in Sudan is being fueled by forces far beyond Sudan’s borders,²² we should avoid overestimating the role of the Wagner Group and labeling the ongoing war in Sudan a proxy war.²³ In Sudan, Russia is keen to keep power in the hands of a strong, small kleptocratic elite that controls its resources.

Conclusion

Great Power Competition produces insecurity in the Global South especially when countries such as Sudan are utilized as a stage for influence and superpower rivalry. Russia’s current engagement in Sudan is built on relations that were established during the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir and characterized by support in international forums, military agreements, Russia’s long-term desire to build a military base in the Red Sea and obtain gold from Sudan. To preserve their interest in Sudan, Russia meddles with politics, strengthened the presence of the Wagner group in the country, and backed the RSF.  

Paramilitary groups such as the RSF are the result of internal political dynamics but they become instrumental allies for superpower such as Russia to expand their influence in the continent. In exchange for military support, the RSF provided Russia with much needed gold that reduced the effect of the U.S. sanctions on Russia. The RSF has also helped Russia to expand their links in the continent and preserve their interests. The engagement between Russia and the RSF undermines not only security but also compromises state-building and democratic transformation. Russia’s relationship with Hemedti empowered and enabled him to build an empire within Sudan that derailed the transition to democracy. The RSF and its leader view Russia as a strategic ally that will help them realize their ambition of leading Sudan.  

During conflicts, security situations become aggravated when competing superpowers take sides, support their ally among the warring parties, and provide them with weapons that contribute to the prolongation of the war. In the April 2023 war between the SAF and RSF, Russia provided weapons to the RSF which made it difficult for the army to defeat them and prolonged the war.

Footnotes:

1: Ataman, Muhittin. 2023. Sudanese crisis: A new front of ‘preventive proxy war.’ May 3. Accessed September 20, 2023. https://www.setav.org/en/
sudanese-crisis-a-new-front-of-preventive-proxy-war/

2: Sukhankin, Sergey. 2020. "Russian Private Military Contractors in Sub-Saharan Africa Strength, Limitations and Implications." Russie.Nei.Visions, September. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/sukhankin_russian_private_military_contractors_africa_2020.pdf

3: Torshin, Mohamed. 2022. Aljazeera Studies Center. July 3. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5409?
fbclid=IwAR2RF2n8g3HkPITgzWZTUGfj6hsCSlRmEyu9p5pnOxugIg4JwxUESeY3U1Y#a1

4: Ibid

5: Abd Al-Shafi, Esam. 2023. Sudan The Russian Base and the Limits of the Military Maneuver. February 19. Accessed March 16, 2023. https://www.aljazeeramubasher.net/opinions/2023/2/19/

6: Associated Press. 2017. Sudan's President Visits Russia, Asks for Protection From US. November 23. Accessed March 16, 2023.
‍https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-president-visits-russia-asks-for-protection-from-us/4131704.html

7: Ali, Ismail Mohamed. 2022. The Russian Wagner and the Gold of Sudan a Mining Concession or plundering. June 10. Accessed March 20, 2023.

‍https://www.independentarabia.com/node/340286/

8: bd Al-Shafi, Esam. 2023. Sudan The Russian Base and the Limits of the Military Maneuver. February 19. Accessed March 16, 2023. https://www.aljazeeramubasher.net/opinions/2023/2/19/

9: Walsh, Declan. 2022. "‘From Russia With Love’: A Putin Ally Mines Gold and Plays Favorites in Sudan." The New York Times. June 5. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html

10: Torshin, Mohamed. 2022. Aljazeera Studies Center. July 3. Accessed March 20, 2023.

‍https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5409?fbclid=
IwAR2RF2n8g3HkPITgzWZTUGfj6hsCSlRmEyu9p5pnOxugIg4JwxUESeY3U1Y#a1

11: Abd Al-Shafi, Esam. 2023. Sudan The Russian Base and the Limits of the Military Maneuver. February 19. Accessed March 16, 2023 https://www.aljazeeramubasher.net/opinions/2023/2/19/

12: Ramani, Samuel. 2019. Moscow's hand in the future of Sudan. July 11. Accessed March 16, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/
79492?fbclid=IwAR3N-CFVmEz_cJNNvDeGbnK1cJfIwDgkec2gSzjd40X9eQDQU7WJx7sAf1E

13: Walsh, Declan. 2022. "‘From Russia With Love’: A Putin Ally Mines Gold and Plays Favorites in Sudan." The New York Times. June 5. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html

14: Abd Al-Shafi, Esam. 2023. Sudan The Russian Base and the Limits of the Military Maneuver. February 19. Accessed March 16, 2023

15: Anan, Emad. 2021. Sudan between the Jaws of the Russians and the Americans. June 10. Accessed March 21, 2023.

‍https://www.noonpost.com/content/40918/

16: Abd Al-Shafi, Esam. 2023. Sudan The Russian Base and the Limits of the Military Maneuver. February 19. Accessed March 16, 2023

17: Ali, Ismail Mohamed. 2022. The Russian Wagner and the Gold of Sudan a Mining Concession or plundering. June 10. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/340286/

18: Walsh, Declan. 2022. "‘From Russia With Love’: A Putin Ally Mines Gold and Plays Favorites in Sudan." The New York Times. June 5. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html

19: Ibid

20: Ali, Ismail Mohamed. 2022. The Russian Wagner and the Gold of Sudan a Mining Concession or plundering. June 10. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/340286/

21: Faucon, Benoit, Drew Hinshaw, Joe Parkinson, and Nicholas Bariyo. 2023. The Last Days of Wagner’s Prigozhin. August 24. Accessed August 30, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/prigozhin-wagner-plane-crash-last-days-2c44dd5c

22: Burke, Jason. 2023. A war for our age. April 30. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/30/
a-war-for-our-age-how-the-battle-for-sudan-is-being-fuelled-by-forces-far-beyond-its-borders

23: Ali, Ismail Mohamed. 2022. The Russian Wagner and the Gold of Sudan a Mining Concession or plundering. June 10. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/340286/

Salma Abdalla is a Political scientist and a researcher holds a Ph.D. from the University of Bayreuth, Germany, and a Master’s degree from the University of Khartoum, Sudan. Over the past decade, she held researcher positions in Germany and Norway and has been a member of international research projects with universities in France and Sweden. Her primary field of research has been political violence, diaspora political engagement, and religion-politics relationships. She has worked as a consultant for think tanks and research institutions on issues of governance and strategies for development transformation in Sudan. She also provided policy advice to various international institutions including the Life and Peace Institute in the Horn of Africa, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and to the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Germany.